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Proof Bench: Online
ECR-WG Draft Architecture · OpenNHP & ZTCPP Synergy Demo

Asynchronous Zero-Port Web Architecture

Eliminating the inbound listening socket attack surface entirely. Rather than hiding synchronous open ports behind packet-knocking or reverse proxies, the origin maintains zero listening sockets, drains an airgapped store-and-forward mailbox on its own schedule, and returns data through single-use ephemeral nonces.

1. Architectural Attack Surface Comparison

Synthetic Network Ingress Simulation

Toggle between network architectures and run a simulated port probe to observe listening socket exposure.

Active Target:ep:mailbox:cleanroom-lab (Zero-Port Origin)
Client / Agent── Deposit Signed Envelope ──▶Untrusted Mailbox Gateway◀── Outbound Queue Drain ──Zero-Port Origin (0 Listeners)

Topology: Complete Asynchronous Mediation. The origin server never executes bind() or listen(). All network traffic is initiated outbound by the origin. The client has zero direct IP route to origin iron.

2. Live Asynchronous Workorder Dispatch & Wire Bench

Real-Time Execution Simulator

Dispatch an asynchronous work envelope into the isolated mailbox gateway and inspect the wire frame returned through the single-use ephemeral return nonce.

4-Phase Zero-Port Ingress Pipeline:
Phase 1: Client seals envelope + ephemeral nonce
Phase 2: Ingested to mailbox buffer (origin silent)
Phase 3: Origin outbound drain & Safe Rust verification
Phase 4: Return receipt emitted; return nonce burnt
Wire Frame Inspector (`ECR-WG/ZeroPort-1.0`)

Dispatch an envelope to inspect the live signed wire frame.

Normative Specification Extract · RFC 2119 Precision

Core Invariants of the Zero-Port Protocol

Invariant 1: Zero Listening Sockets

The origin server MUST NOT bind or listen to any network port (TCP, UDP, or SCTP). Inbound SYN packets arriving at the network interface MUST be silently dropped without emitting TCP RST.

Invariant 2: Double-Blind Nonce Routing

The client MUST NOT possess an IP route to the origin. Clients deposit work envelopes to an airgapped mailbox gateway enclosing a single-use 256-bit ephemeral return token burnt upon delivery.

Invariant 3: Signed Consequence Proofs

Every workorder executed by the origin MUST be evaluated against a monotonic capability lattice and sealed with an Ed25519 signature before any physical or logical state mutation occurs.

OpenNHP & ZTCPP Synergy:OpenNHP eBPF packet-filtering protects mailbox gateways, while ECR-WG eliminates origin attack surfaces.
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